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DRAG = BLACKFACE
KELLY KLEIMAN*
To most educated Americans, performance in blackface is an
artifact of long ago, an embarrassing reminder of a distant past in
which overt racism was tolerated, as obsolete a form of cultural
expression as lawn jockeys or the Uncle Tom in the turn-of-the-
century Cream of Wheat ads. In fact, though, the consensus that
blackface performance is intolerably racist is of relatively recent
vintage. Before that, analyses of blackface minstrelsy-even those
that conceded its racism -concentrated on the meaning of the
performance to the performers and the audience, ignoring or
discounting its meaning to, and impact on, the people being
portrayed.
That is the current state of scholarship about performance in
drag. Why hasn't our understanding that blackface is insulting
extended itself to drag? In this Essay, I hope to begin that extension,
suggesting that the same arguments that forged the cultural consensus
against blackface should forge a consensus against drag. We retain a
salutary sense of shock when the BBC replaces James Earl Jones as
Othello with a white actor in blackface.1 What will it take to develop
that sense of shock when a man plays Lady Bracknell?
In this Essay, "drag" means men dressing as women in public,
especially in performance. I argue that a whole range of activities,
from vaudeville "illusionists" to the pantomime dame, from Mrs.
Doubtfire to La Cage aux Folles, from cross-dresser balls in Harlem
to Hasty Pudding theatricals at Harvard, represent institutionalized
male hostility to women on a spectrum running from prescription of
desired behavior to simple ridicule. These performances may be
glamorous or comic, and presented by gay men or straight men.
Nonetheless, all of them represent a continuing insult to women, as is
apparent from the parallels between these performances and those of
white performers of blackface minstrelsy.
* The author would like to thank Professor Anita Bernstein of Emory University School
of Law for her helpful comments and indispensable advice and support in the shaping of this
Essay.
1. See WILLIAM TORBERT LEONARD, MASQUERADE IN BLACK 123-25 (1986).
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My definition of drag excludes private transvestism precisely on
the grounds of its privacy, though I invoke the arguments made for
public acceptance of transvestism as examples of bad reasoning in
support of drag. The definition also excludes women dressing up as
men, for reasons that will become clear.
Drag and blackface in American culture are similar in a number
of respects. First, each is a masquerade in which powerful or
privileged people dress up as less powerful or less privileged people.
Examples are legion though, pointedly, examples of drag are more
current than those of blackface. Major contemporary Hollywood
movies such as Tootsie and The Birdcage have drag as a central plot
device, while the last use of blackface in American film is in movies of
the 1950s that are almost never seen. Similarly, drag is pervasive on
television, from Flip Wilson to Monty Python's Flying Circus to
Bosom Buddies (in which Tom Hanks got his big break in a dress),
while blackface is unknown: even the repulsive Amos 'n' Andy,
originally written by and for two white comedians, was televised
featuring African-American actors.
Second, drag and blackface originated when the impersonated
people were excluded from the stage; however, each outlasted that
original excuse for its practice.2 That is, audiences were curious to see
Africans and African-Americans on the stage long before they were
permitted to appear, and plots required the inclusion of women long
before women were permitted on the English-speaking stage. But
even after African-Americans gained access to the minstrel stage,
white performers continued to impersonate them. Similarly, long
after women were permitted on the stage-to this day, in fact-men
continue to appear as women.
These practices led to expectations of what the impersonated
person ought to look like. For instance, the convention of white
performers impersonating African-Americans was so powerful that
black performers were required to wear blackface.3  It seems
ludicrous now that black performers had to "black up" to play
themselves-that is, black people. But this is no different from
women having their breasts enlarged so they will be sufficiently
feminine. African-Americans had to be a particular kind of black to
2. For a history of blackface minstrelsy, see ROBERT C. TOLL, BLACKING UP: THE
MINSTREL SHOW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1974). For a history of performance in
drag, see ROGER BAKER, DRAG: A HISTORY OF FEMALE IMPERSONATION IN THE
PERFORMING ARTS (1994).
3. See TOLL, supra note 2, at 200-01.
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be black enough to satisfy white people; women have to be a
particular kind of feminine to be woman enough to satisfy men.
Third, drag and blackface show the person(s) being
impersonated in a restricted range of behaviors, characterized by
exaggeration that is at least interpretable as insult. African-
Americans were shown singing, dancing, being foolish, or longing for
the old plantation; women are shown primping, nagging, or longing
for male protection. With respect to blackface, at least, the scholarly
consensus is clear: such "stereotyping was a primary example of the
majority culture's desire to maintain political, social, and economic
control by transferring false theories of racial inferiority into a form
of comic theater designed to demean African-Americans."4 As
Marlon Riggs notes in his documentary Ethnic Notions, blackface
made "the distinctive physical features of blacks not only laughable
but grotesque."5  The big lips assigned to African-Americans by
blackface performers have a virtually exact parallel in the big breasts
that are mandatory for drag performers.
Blackface presents its exaggerations through two standard
"types," Zip Coon (an urban dandy out of his depth) and Sambo (a
shuffling rural fool). The first makes fun of black people for being
free while the second ridicules them for being slaves. Drag has a pair
of "types" of its own, the glamour girl and the pantomime dame (an
elderly harridan). The first makes fun of women because of their
sexuality and the second for their lack of it.6 This commonality-in
which the aspirations of African-Americans and the sexuality of
women are either exaggerated or ignored -suggests the parallel
nature of the practices.
Both pairs of tropes are deeply reactionary, and both assert that
the people imitated need controlling. Zip Coon is out of control, a
menace loose in the city; Sambo is simply incapable of caring for
himself. The glamour girl is either predatory or helpless; the
pantomime dame is either an idiot or a harpy. One and all, they are
people who cannot-or cannot be permitted to-care for themselves.
And people who do not care for themselves do not get to represent
themselves. If people are incompetent to represent themselves, in the
political as well as artistic sense, they have to be represented -which
4. William J. Mahar, Ethiopian Skits and Sketches, in INSIDE THE MINSTREL MASK 179,
182 (Annemarie Bean et al. eds., 1996).
5. ETHNIC NOTIONS: BLACK PEOPLE IN WHITE MINDS (California Newsreel 1987).
6. See generally BAKER, supra note 2.
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is to say governed-by others.
I am hardly the first person to notice the larger consequences of
performance images. Toll summarizes the problem with minstrel
images of black people: "[W]hen white Americans later came in
contact with Afro-Americans, whites who were disposed to confirm
the caricatures could do it by focusing on the familiar elements, like
superstition, love of music and dance, and the 'childish' belief in 'silly'
animal fables and by ignoring everything else about blacks. '7
Likewise, even those who defend drag as a valuable or privileged
public expression are easily able to articulate the central objection to
it. Journalist Holly Brubach, author of a sympathetic portrait of drag
queens (men both gay and straight "who dress as women in public, on
social occasions"),8 prefaces her book by saying, "What impressed me
about drag.., was that it articulates men's idea of women .... [T]he
men I found who dress in drag most often became babes if not
outright bimbos, bearing little resemblance to the ideal most women
have set for themselves."9 Similarly, Sambo bore little resemblance
either to the antebellum slave or the postbellum freed black man of
the south.
More insidiously, to the extent that there was a resemblance
between Sambo-who resists work, tells lies, and fails to take
seriously matters of great concern to the master-and any actual
African-Americans in a condition of captivity or dependence, that
resemblance was attributable not to black people but to slavery.
Thus, Sambo was a presentation of the way white people prefer their
black people, that is, enslaved. Moreover, the repetition of the
Sambo stereotype conditioned white audiences to recognize only
Sambo-like behaviors in the actual African-Americans they met.
Small wonder that eradication of the stereotype was a priority for
civil rights leaders.
Likewise, to the extent that there is a resemblance between male
"pantomime dames" or "glamour girls" and actual women, that
resemblance is an indictment of the conditions in which real women
struggle rather than a justification of the practice of performance. In
this light, the current popularity of drag seems ominous. It means
that men become more insistent on displaying the traditional roles of
women as many women challenge them: "No, no, you don't get it,
7. TOLL, supra note 2, at 51.
8. HOLLY BRUBACH, GIRLFRIEND: MEN, WOMEN, AND DRAG xviii (1999).
9. Id. at xviii-xix.
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being a woman looks like this."
Fourth, the forms of drag and blackface perform the same
function: to ease the minds of an audience threatened by change
(whether this pertains to the coming of abolition or the advent of
sexual equality) by presenting the agents of that change as ridiculous
rather than frightening. Precisely because the performances are
about change, what they "mean" is not a fixed thing but changes over
time. T. D. "Daddy" Rice, the man whose minstrel turn as "Jim
Crow" lends its name to every aspect of American racism, intended
and imagined himself as a respectful interpreter of the exotic culture
of African-Americans. Even that original intention could not and
should not have saved blackface from its critics. At a certain point
white audiences had to acknowledge that it was unfair for black
people to bear the burden of being misrepresented for the purpose,
mostly, of other people's comfort. It is about time to acknowledge
the same thing about women.
Clearly, the forms are not identical, and the parallels between
oppression based on race and oppression based on gender are
inexact. Because gender cross-dressing is also associated with anxiety
about sexuality (as blackface is not, at least in any obvious way), drag
carries multiple meanings in a way that blackface does not. These
multiple meanings contribute to the most striking way in which
blackface and drag are not alike: the continued, unapologetic practice
of drag.
An account of the process by which blackface became
anathema-a confluence of events including the rise of the twentieth
century civil rights movement and the rise of realism in the arts,
especially the movies--is beyond the scope of this Essay.10 Instead, I
will consider the ideas around which that process coalesced. There
are two of them: (1) that the portrait of African-Americans contained
in blackface minstrelsy was an insult and (2) that the fact of
portraiture itself was unacceptable. The first idea is based on what is
portrayed and revulsion at such a portrayal. The second idea is based
on who is portraying. It rests on the understanding that any cross-
racial performance constitutes an appropriation-a theft-of
blackness by whites.
The second half of the consensus is weak enough that people
occasionally defend (the very few) contemporary uses of blackface by
10. See DONALD BOGLE, TOMS, COONS, MULATTOES. MAMMIES, AND BUCKS (3d. ed.
1994).
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adverting to the intentions of the performer. When Ted Danson
blacked up for a public performance in 1993, he and his long-time
lover Whoopi Goldberg imagined that his nonracist credentials
("lover of a black woman") would protect him from objections."
They were wrong. If the insult is simply to believe that the culture
and experience of black people is trivial enough to be put on like a
costume, the intentions of the performer are not relevant. The
content of the performance may be respectful, but the very fact of the
performance is disrespectful. 2
Most people understand this point well enough to be appalled on
re-reading Norman Mailer's essay The White Negro, in which he
posits African-Americans as the repository of authenticity from
whom white people must learn. "Only by cultivating his 'dark,
romantic, and yet undeniably dynamic view of existence' can the
white man reconnect with the primitive, vital 'Negro' within himself,
and thereby recapture his own vaunted 'individuality.""' 3
This is an embarrassment to read today-get in touch with your
inner Negro?-but how is it any different from announcements by
male cross-dressers of every stripe (from straight transvestites to gay
drag queens to Dustin Hoffman in the movie Tootsie) that wearing
women's clothing enables them to get in touch with their authentic
inner woman, their feminine side? 4 Taking this claim at face value,
one sees the whole problem: drag enables men to decide, and then to
claim, what is "feminine"; and it permits men to ascribe certain
characteristics to women and certain others to men, and then regard
the remaining characteristics as problematic if they happen to show
up in a member of the wrong gender.
11. See Thomas Huang, When the Laughter Stops, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 13,
1995, at 1C (noting that Danson and Goldberg had explained the act as "a parody of the racism
they had run into during their relationship").
12. As bell hooks explains,
It is a sign of white privilege to be able to "see" blackness and black culture from a
standpoint where only the rich culture of opposition black people have created in
resistance marks and defines us. Such a perspective enables one to ignore white
supremacist domination and the hurt it inflicts via oppression, exploitation, and
everyday wounds and pains.
bell hooks, Madonna: Plantation Mistress or Soul Sister, in BLACK ON WHITE 307, 308 (David R.
Roediger ed., 1998).
13. James S. Miller, Racial Imitations: White Subjects, Black Others and the Legitimation
of American Culture, 1920-1950, at 3 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with author).
14. See, e.g., REBECCA BELL-METEREAU, HOLLYWOOD ANDROGYNY 200-04 (1993);
Virginia Prince, Seventy Years in the Trenches of the Gender Wars, in GENDER BLENDING 469,
475 (Bonnie Bullough et al. eds., 1997); Elaine Showalter, Critical Cross-Dressing: Male
Feminists and the Woman of the Year, RAR1TAN, Fall 1983, at 130, 136-37.
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The culture and experience of women is not a costume.
Everything I do is feminine, by definition, because I am female, while
any decree about what is feminine restricts my range of options.
When RuPaul says, "we're born naked and the rest is drag," 15 he is
wrong. He is in drag because he is a man, and he can stop being a
woman whenever it becomes inconvenient. When being a woman is
inconvenient for me, I need to remove the inconvenience. Male ideas
of "femininity" are a major inconvenience to those of us who are
actually women and have to live our lives in that state.
Is drag the most important aspect of male discrimination against
women? No, probably not; nor was the eradication of the big-lipped
Gold Dust Twins the most important victory of the civil rights
struggle. But images do matter; we learn to see and understand
people according to what we have been told about them. The more
white people portray black people, the less room there is for black
people to speak for themselves. The more men portray women, the
harder it is for women to be understood for themselves.
The parallels between drag and blackface are so obvious that it
seems bizarre that the intellectual consensus against blackface has not
formed against drag. Instead, defenses of the practice continue to
appear. All four of the principal defenses are, in my opinion, false.
Drag is not a liberating challenge to gender stereotypes, nor is it a
timeless statement of gay pride, nor is it legitimated by female cross-
dressing, a practice separate and unequal. Nor is it funny.
A number of scholars argue that drag contributes to women's
liberation by subverting gender stereotypes, revealing the constructed
nature of most gender-linked behavior.16 At its most extreme, this
argument disputes the reality of gender itself:
[T]he arguments of modern theorists such as Garber, Butler, and
Joan Riviere [are] that all gender is performative or, in Riviere's
famous phrase, a "masquerade".... While [an earlier] account
posits an interior self to be shaped and corrected by performance,
modem accounts argue that this interiority is an effect produced by
the masquerade, and that status as "woman" or "man" is achieved
not by being born with a particular anatomy but by performing
gendered behaviors successfully in accordance with prevailing
social norms. 7
15. BAKER, supra note 2, at 258 (quoting RuPaul).
16. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF
"SEX" 124-138 (1993) [hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER]; JUDITH BUTLER,
GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 137 (1990) [hereinafter
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE]: MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS (1992).
17. Ellen Bayuk Rosenman, "Just Man Enough to Play the Boy": Theatrical Cross-Dressing
2000]
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Thus: "Genders can be neither true nor false, neither real nor
apparent, neither original nor derived."'18
The argument that all gender is performative begins soundly
enough with the observation that lots of things women "can't" do are
actually merely things that women are not permitted to do, and that
therefore it is wise to be skeptical of many essentialist claims. But it is
quite a leap from there to saying that there is no such thing as a
"woman," and therefore one may claim "womanhood" on any basis,
including the possession of an evening gown. This latter argument
means that cross-dressing eradicates women entirely. If anyone who
puts on women's clothing is a woman, and many of those people do
not have a problem with unequal pay or a lack of reproductive rights,
then there must not be a problem.
The argument that the very recognition of the category "woman"
validates male supremacy is, in this context, false and dangerous.
This is clear from the analogy with race. There may be no such thing
as "race" insofar as most of the attributes given to people based on
their perceived skin color have little or nothing to do with skin color,
but "race" certainly does exist if we are trying to understand the
experience of people whose skin color puts them at a constant
disadvantage in competing for opportunities in a larger society. That
experience of "race" is actual and distinct, a fact we readily
acknowledge in noting the difference between a white man "blacking
up" and a black man. The experience of gender is similarly actual
and distinct-if there is no such thing as a "woman," who is being
paid seventy-three cents on the dollar?
The fact that women are already oppressed-instructed by men
how to look and behave for male convenience-does not mean that
the most extreme version of this is therefore inoffensive. Quite the
contrary: we need to challenge the most public ways in which men
specify women's conduct so we can overcome even their more subtle
dictates. The acceptance of drag is one of those "most public ways,"
such an obvious imposition of male preference on female decision
that it is practically invisible. Just as African-Americans were taught
by blacked-up white minstrels that they ought to shuffle-and, more
important, white people were taught to expect African-Americans to
shuffle-women are taught by dolled-up male glamour girls and
pantomime dames to be hyper-sexual, and shown that failure to do so
in Mid-Victorian England, in GENDER BLENDING, supra note 14, at 303, 306.
18. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 16, at 141.
[Vol. 75:669
DRAG = BLACKFACE
renders them repulsive and superfluous. Again more important, men
are taught the same lesson.
Erika Munk dismissed the claims for drag's subversive status in a
few pungent paragraphs in the Village Voice:
At the moment, most men in drag are no more subversive than
whites in blackface were when minstrel shows were America's most
popular form of entertainment.... The more women fight for
autonomy, the less helpful become restatements of stereotype
which have lost their critical edge and turned into means of putting
women down and aside. Drag may be liberating when it's part of a
wave of iconoclastic revolt, but when the culture is rigid and
conformist, taking on feminine personae while edging women from
the stage is rigid and conformist too. It doesn't have to be so-the
radical possibilities remain -but it is.' 9
Many people understand "drag" to mean private cross-dressing
for sexual satisfaction. For the purposes of this Essay, I am
indifferent to private cross-dressing (overwhelmingly an activity of
straight men), just as I would be indifferent if burnt cork or black
greasepaint suddenly gained currency as an aphrodisiac. Private
conduct is none of our business. But the set of arguments marshaled
by private cross-dressers in support of their call for public acceptance
is a matter of public concern, and these arguments are as
unpersuasive as those of the feminist scholars whose work (as well as
bras) they are appropriating.
Straight men who cross-dress generally describe doing so as a
compulsion. If it is, then its victims should receive sympathy, not
public approbation. Some people who have Tourette's syndrome feel
compelled to curse; that is not an argument for generalized public
acceptance of profanity.
In The Man in the Red Velvet Dress, J. J. Allen, a private cross-
dresser, makes an argument that he shares with those who affect or
defend performance drag. He argues that women have a privilege-
to wear satin evening gowns-from which men are unfairly barred.
If men and women are to achieve true equality, everything should
be up for grabs: miniskirts, boxer shorts, the office of the president
of the United States, congressional seats, wearing cosmetics ....
While the women's liberation movement of the sixties was not
merely about wearing pants, smoking, or working as a riveter, it
nevertheless had its roots in appropriating those artifacts that had
once been exclusively associated with masculinity. And while
19. Erika Munk, Drag: L Men, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 5, 1985, at 89.
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femininity is about more than simply wearing skirts and cosmetics,
men, if they are to be truly equal with women, should be free to
appropriate the artifacts of femininity.20
This is total sophistry. First, the women's movement "had its
roots" in a demand for justice; the "artifacts ... of masculinity" were
secondary. Second, men are not "equal" with women, they are
privileged over them. Men who want to wear women's clothing
simply cannot do it in the street without being stared at. This seems
like a very small price to pay, hardly comparable to being unable to
join the professions.
Allen continues, "[W]omen do not 'own' femininity any more
than men 'own' masculinity. So in the same way that feminism wants
to destroy the barriers to male privilege that men have erected,
[cross-dressers] want to destroy the barriers to female privilege that
women have erected."' 21 Wrong again: "femininity" is not a female
privilege-it is a construct designed to keep women in their place.
And feminists are not trying to appropriate masculinity, that is, the
state of being male or taken for male; we are trying to achieve equal
rights. To argue that women's clothing is a mark of privilege, when so
much else about being a woman is obviously a mark of disadvantage,
is to willfully miss the point, as Allen makes clear when he falsely
equates a woman's right to admission to the Citadel with his "right"
to wear women's underpants.22 This assumes that an identifying
badge of status is the same thing as a privilege, which is only true if
you assume what is obviously false, namely, that all statuses are equal.
Allen likewise claims that there is no difference between
women's cross-dressing (e.g., to be able to serve as a soldier) and
men's cross-dressing.23 He also asserts that there is no difference
between the class of things men are expected not to do (e.g., wear
evening gowns) and those women are expected not to do (e.g., get
paid for their work). 24 When Allen refers to disapproval of cross-
dressing as "another gender wrong that need[s] to be righted, '25 he is
trivializing all of feminism.
Allen borrows from academic theorists of gender-bending to
argue that recognizing some clothes as "women's" and other clothes
20. J. J. ALLEN, THE MAN IN THE RED VELVET DRESS 124-25 (1996).
21. Id. at 125.
22. Id. at 126.
23. Id. at 137.
24. Id. at 121-22, 138-39.
25. Id. at 126.
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as "men's" reinforces the oppressiveness of traditional categories. 26
In fact, though, those categories are precisely the point to a cross-
dresser. If these were not specifically women's garments, he would
not be interested in them. If there were no performed sex roles
connected with a costume, then the entire activity of transvestism-
sexual excitement while spending time temporarily as "the other"-
would be beside the point.21
Another group of scholars argues that dressing up in women's
clothing is a privileged activity of gay men. For the most part, in fact,
dressing up in women's clothing is an activity of straight men-and
whether it is privileged when done in public is exactly what is in
contention.
"Professional drag queens are... professional homosexuals; they
represent the stigma of the gay world," announces Esther Newton in
her seminal study of drag, Mother Camp.2s "Not all gay people want
to wear drag, but drag symbolizes gayness. The drag queen
symbolizes an open declaration, even celebration, of homosexual-
ity."29 She continues: "[D]rag questions the 'naturalness' of the sex-
role system in toto; if sex-role behavior can be achieved by the
'wrong' sex, it logically follows that it is in reality also achieved, not
'inherited,' by the 'right' sex."30
This is received wisdom, to the extent anything can be in the
contentious world of gender studies; but it is, at best, a half-truth.
The only way to argue that drag is gay is to exclude from its definition
a whole range of activities in which men dress as women, including
not only private cross-dressing but the lion's share of comic drag
performance.
Even Judith Butler, who valorizes glamour drag as gay
performance art, acknowledges this comic, and ostensibly
heterosexual, side of drag, which she calls "high het entertainment."31
This includes most people's exposure to drag before the mid-1980s:
26. Id. at 136.
27. As Annie Woodhouse notes in her feminist study of straight men's private cross-
dressing, dismissing the claim that the conduct is revolutionary: "Undoubtedly transvestism
replicates gender divisions; it relies on images of women which have been used to objectify and
oppress them. The transvestite uses this as fantasy for his own pleasure, always retaining the
facility to return to the primary status of masculinity." ANNIE WOODHOUSE, FANTASTIC
WOMEN: SEX, GENDER AND TRANSVESTISM 145 (1989).
28. ESTHER NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP 3 (1972).
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 103.
31. BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 16, at 126.
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the Hope-Crosby Road movies, Flip Wilson as Geraldine in the Flip
Wilson Show, Jonathan Winters as a washerwoman on the Carol
Burnett Show, and Jack Lemmon and Tony Curtis in Some Like It
Hot. Several of these performers are notorious for the fuss they made
about their heterosexuality; and, though perhaps they protested too
much, there seems little doubt that most comic drag performers (like
most people) are straight. To argue that drag is a "queer practice[]"
whose "radical specificity" protects it from objection, as Butler does,"
is both ahistorical and unprincipled, resembling the argument that
clitoridectomy is acceptable because it is practiced by Africans
oppressed by colonialism-or that blackface was acceptable because
it was practiced on stage largely by Jews.
In any case, as historian Marybeth Hamilton makes clear, the
universal association of glamour drag with gay men dates in this
country from 1928, specifically from the production of Mae West's
play Pleasure Man, which purported to provide a realistic backstage
look at female impersonators ("realistic" being a euphemism for
"gay").33 As Hamilton notes, through Pleasure Man, West almost
single-handedly transformed female impersonation from a
mainstream vaudeville specialty into an outrd pleasure. "[T]hough
we take female impersonation's inherent 'queerness' for granted, in
fact that assumption is relatively recent.... [F]or the fifty years prior
to Pleasure Man's premiere, female impersonation had been viewed
as wholesome amusement, particularly suitable for women and
children.' 34
Vaudeville female impersonation owed its popularity to the
notion that the differences between men and women were so
enormous that a man who could pass for a woman was essentially a
magician. Thus, it was about putting people-specifically women-in
their deeply conventional places. "While vaudeville hailed imper-
sonators as virile men transforming themselves through magical skills
of performance, Mae West suggested a far more sensational reading:
that female impersonation was a vehicle of homosexual self-
expression, a means for gay men to flaunt their true sexual selves." 35
Mae West didn't invent this notion; she derived it from an
32- Id. at 128.
33. Marybeth Hamilton, "I'm the Queen of the Bitches," Female Impersonation and Mae
West's Pleasure Man, in CROSSING THE STAGE: CONTROVERSIES ON CROSS-DRESSING 107,
107-19 (Lesley Ferris ed., 1993).
34. Id. at 107.
35. Id. at 112.
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underground tradition of female impersonation parallel to
conventional vaudeville.
The underworld impersonator .... made no pretense of showcasing
a skill of performance, of attempting to impress observers with
impeccable recreations of feminine detail. The whole thrill of his
stage appearances lay, on the contrary, in the fact that he was not,
technically, performing at all. He was displaying his real, offstage,
self-as (in turn-of-the-century terms) a "fairy," a "third sexer," a
being who straddled the gender divide.36
However disingenuously, Mae West denied that she had done
anything radical with her play, adverting to the existence of
mainstream impersonation, which validated sexual stereotypes, to
protect her presentation of "deviant" impersonation, which
challenged them. But instead of saving her play, she succeeded only
in tagging all glamour female impersonation as gay and thus
eliminating it from the vaudeville stage.
Once dressing in drag was "recognized" as gay (and then
banned), it is not surprising that the gay community would claim
appearing in drag as one of the privileges of being liberated,
especially when drag queens featured so prominently as fighters in
the pivotal Stonewall riot.37 Like use of the word "nigger" in the
African-American community, dressing in drag can be seen as an
effort to transform a stigma into a badge of pride. But clearly being
gay and being effeminate are not the same, and neither of them
requires dressing in drag. The connection between drag and gay men
is at best vestigial, like the appendix, and thus can be removed.
Moreover, once we acknowledge the fluidity of drag's meaning-that
it suggests different things to different audiences at different times-
we must also acknowledge the claim of women to decide what it
means today. No prior claim of meaning can possibly take priority
over that of the subject/object of the practice. Some commentators
imagine that the complaint of misogyny is directed at drag's gay
practitioners rather than at the practice itself.
The problem with the analysis of drag as only misogyny is, of
course, that it figures male-to-female transsexuality, cross-dressing,
and drag as male homosexual activities -which they are not
always-and it further diagnoses male homosexuality as rooted in
misogyny. The feminist analysis thus makes male homosexuality
about women .... 38
36. Id. at 115-16.
37. See SUSAN FALUDI, STIFFED: THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN MAN 500-02 (1999).
38. BUTLER, BODIES THAT MArTTER, supra note 16, at 127.
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In fact, it is just the reverse: this analysis makes male
impersonation of women about homosexuals. Drag is misogynistic,
no matter who performs it. The relevant fact about gay men dressing
as women is that they are men dressing as women. As Kate Millett
wrote:
[Tihe storm of outrage an insouciant queen in drag may call down
is due to the fact that she is both masculine and feminine at once-or
male, but feminine. [And thus] [s]he has... challenged more than
the taboo on homosexuality, she has uncovered what the source of
this contempt implies-the fact that sex role is sex rank.39
Drag is not about gay men and their sexuality-not, that is, about
the intentions of the performers. (As with blackface, the intentions of
the performers are beside the point.) Drag is not about sexuality at
all, but about gender, its images and stereotypes-and those always
mean things that privilege men and injure women.
Much of the literature about this seems to miss the point,
suggesting that the drag performer is the person oppressed. For
instance, Rebecca Bell-Metereau is concerned about the stereotyping
of drag performers:
Just as film images of blacks, with rare exceptions, have tended to
offer only two basic stereotypes- the evil, no-good Negro and the
good-hearted Uncle Tom or nanny-movie depictions of female
impersonation during the Code era fall into similarly constrained
categories. Men are seldom allowed to take on feminine clothing
or roles without being punished for betraying their sex.4°
This focus on the performer rather than on the woman being
portrayed is peculiar, the equivalent of a discussion about what
blackface meant to its white working-class performers: possibly an
interesting sidelight, but hardly the point. Bell-Metereau continues,
"A film that defies society's codes of dress and sex roles implies that
we can be liberated from superficial restrictions and sexual
limitations, for in truly exploring androgyny the work taps the most
profound psychological and mythic sources of art-the genderless
human psyche."'4'
This is the conventional defense of drag: that it enables us to
transcend restrictions imposed by gender, which is, after all, just a
social invention. But I do not have a "genderless human psyche"-I
have a woman's psyche, formed by my experience of being
morphologically, biologically, sexually, and socially a woman. As Pat
39. KATE MILLETr, SEXUAL POLMcs 343 (1970).
40. BELL-METEREAU, supra note 14, at 65.
41. Id.
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Schroeder said when asked if she were running for President "as a
woman,". "'Do I have an option?"'42 To impersonate gender is not to
eradicate it but to reinforce it, to reify it and, more important, the
power relations attached to it.
Imitation may be the sincerest form of flattery, but do not tell
that to anyone whose work has been plagiarized. Drag performers-
gay or straight-plagiarize the appearance and behavior of women,
just as minstrels plagiarized the appearance and behavior (or some
facsimile) of African-Americans. The historical moment for wearing
blackface was over as soon as the larger society was prepared to
acknowledge the authenticity of black people. The historical moment
for wearing drag should be over now if society is prepared to
acknowledge the authenticity -that is, the independent validity-of
women.
Some scholars suggest that dressing across gender lines is an
equal-opportunity sport because there is a tradition of women
dressing as men (as there is not of black people masquerading as
white people). Unless you ignore the power differential between men
and women in society, this is nonsense. Annie Woodhouse makes
clear that all gender-bending is not created equal.
The gender divide is not one of equal balance; the scales of power
and control tip decisively to the side of masculinity, which is
accordingly attributed primary status. Thus, to deviate from this
status is to take a step down; to adopt the trappings of the second
sex is akin to slumming it, or selling out.43
Thus, women who dress as men are dressing up, seeking power,
privilege, or even just protective camouflage from male violence;
while men dressing as women are dressing down. As Janice
Raymond says in her critique of all things "trans,"
[A] woman putting on a man's clothes is, in a sense, putting on
male power status, whereas a man putting on women's clothes is
putting on parody. That drag queens and cross-dressers draw hoots
and howls in audiences of mostly men says more about how women
were and are perceived than it does about the supposed boundary-
breaking behaviour of gender-bending men who wear women's
clothes.44
In other words: masters making fun of slaves, or at most making
fun of themselves, do not equal slaves poking fun at masters. Humor
42. LINDA WITT ET AL., RUNNING AS A WOMAN ix (1995).
43. WOODHOUSE, supra note 27, at 6-7.
44. Janice Raymond, The Politics of Transgenderism, in BLENDING GENDERS 215. 217
(Richard Ekins & Dave King eds., 1996).
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is what masters get in addition to power and what slaves get instead
of it. Raymond adds,
Gender bending is gender identity condensed to the point of
little or no feminist or lesbian politics.... The new gender outlaw is
the old gender conformist, only this time we have men conforming
to femininity and women conforming to masculinity.... What good
is a gender outlaw who is still abiding by the law of gender?45
But of course it is not the arguments of feminist or gay scholars
that make drag acceptable to the wider public. Scholars in general,
and feminist and gay scholars in particular, are held in low regard in
American society. To the extent that their arguments have currency,
it is because they serve the interests of those who are more powerful.
The people keeping drag alive are the people who benefit somehow
from the argument that being a woman is something you can just put
on and take off. Their claim is very simple: drag is funny.
What exactly is funny about it? Perhaps it is the simple
incongruity: you can always knock 'em dead with chest hair pouring
out of the cleavage of an evening gown. Perhaps the contrast
between the (male) performer and the (female) performance is, in
and of itself, uproarious. But this seems like a pretty thin joke on
which to hang years of amusement. Unless you think that men are
from Mars and women are from Venus-that is, that differences in
gender behavior are huge and immutable-the contrast does not hold
much interest. Certainly, the contrast between white performers and
black characters was not, in and of itself, enough to make blackface
funny. There had to be something else-and there was.
There was ridicule of black people. No one rationalized
blackface by suggesting that the very contrast between the (white)
performer and the (black) performed was funny or interesting in and
of itself. No, what was funny or interesting was the glimpse blackface
purported to offer into the world of African-Americans. "Aren't they
stupid?" "Don't they have weird physical features?" "But they sing
good songs and dance funny dances, and doesn't that prove they're
happy in the confinement in which we've placed them?"
Men who dress up as women and adopt stereotyped feminine
behaviors are comical because of their stereotyped behavior, and the
inference they encourage the audience to draw is not that stereotypes
are comical but that women are; not that social restrictions are foolish
but that the people restricted are. It would be hard to imagine as
45. Id. at 222-23.
[Vol. 75:669
DRAG = BLACKFACE
clear an example of blaming the victim-if blackface had not already
provided us with one.
This entire society reifies the concept that the behavior of
women should be dictated by men because men know best. Men
know that marriage is best for women; men know that child rearing is
best for women; men know that getting paid and recognized less is
best for women. I do not really think that men also need to be able to
say that they know-and will demonstrate-how perfectly lean and
curveless women should look in their evening gowns.
Glamour drag, which depends on downplaying the incongruity,
minimizing the contrast between performer and performed, and
concealing the "masculine" within the "feminine," makes clear the
prescriptive nature of all drag. The point of glamour drag is not to
tell jokes but to perform the feminine. The only reason to hire a man
for this purpose-when there are plenty of women available, by
definition more experienced and better qualified-is to give men the
continued right and privilege to determine the content of the
feminine. Just as white people in blackface announced and
established the limits of African-Americans' behavior, men in dresses
announce, establish, and enforce the limits of what will be expected
of, and tolerated from, women.
Minstrel performances of cake-walking took the dance out of its
compulsory context to present African-Americans as feckless and
jolly in servitude. Similarly, glamour drag takes glamour out of its
context, which is the need women have to use sexual attractiveness to
secure male protection in a society that punishes women who are
without it. And if even those sober-faced performances are funny, it
must be because women themselves are a joke. "Look at how vain
and foolish they are!" "Look how self-absorbed!" "Look how
trivial!" "Aren't women funny when they want sex?" "And aren't
they hilarious when they don't?"
Thus, drag's humor depends entirely on the audience's
willingness to believe that women are rightfully the butt of every joke.
Does it seem humorless to refuse to participate? Well, it was
precisely the fact that blackface impersonation was a joke -played by
white people, for white people, through the medium of and on black
people-that led ultimately to its condemnation. In fact, Ralph
Ellison's 1958 essay-perhaps the single most important scholarly
contribution to the eradication of blackface-is called Change the
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
Joke and Slip the Yoke.46 Ellison points out first that what have been
taken by white audiences to be the archetypes of the black experience
are, in fact, its stereotypes.47 He then addresses the defense of high
spirits and boyish fun, saying,
Down at the deep dark bottom of the melting pot, where the
private is public and the public private, where black is white and
white black, where the immoral becomes moral and the moral is
anything that makes one feel good (or that one has the power to
sustain), the white man's relish is apt to be the black man's gall.
It is not at all odd that this black-faced figure of white fun is for
Negroes a symbol of everything they rejected in the white man's
thinking about race, in themselves and in their own group. 48
Likewise, the drag queen is a symbol of everything women reject
in men's thinking about gender, and the relish of drag performance-
by performer and audience alike -is every woman's gall.
46. Ralph Ellison, Change the Joke and Slip the Yoke, PARTISAN REV., Spring 1958, at 212,
212-22.
47. Id. at 212-13.
48. Id. at 215.
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